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Every year billions of chickens are shipped thousands of miles around the globe in order to
meet the ever increasing demands for this cheap and nutritious protein source. Unfortu-
nately, transporting chickens internationally can also increase the chance for introducing
zoonotic viruses, such as highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) to new countries. Our
study used a retrospective analysis of poultry trading data from 2003 through 2011 to
assess the risk of H5N1 poultry infection in an importing country. We found that the risk of
infection in an importing country increased by a factor of 1.3 (95% CI: 1.1e1.5) for every 10-
fold increase in live chickens imported from countries experiencing at least one H5N1
poultry case during that year. These results suggest that the risk in a particular country can
be significantly reduced if imports from countries experiencing an outbreak are decreased
during the year of infection or if biosecurity measures such as screening, vaccination, and
infection control practices are increased. These findings show that limiting trade of live
chickens or increasing infection control practices during contagious periods may be an
important step in reducing the spread of H5N1 and other emerging avian influenza viruses.
© 2017 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Commu-
nications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) was first identified in Chinese poultry in 1996 and has spread to 53 countries
as of July 2014 (Organization for Animal Health, 2014a). Previous studies suggest that both poultry trade and bird migration
are the main drivers spreading this virus to previously uninfected countries (Kilpatrick et al., 2006). Unfortunately, due to
limited or poor infectious disease surveillance, identified and reported H5N1 cases are likely to only represent the tip of the
iceberg of the true number of cases occurring in a particular country. Consequently, limiting trade of live birds or increasing
prevention efforts during this time may have greater impacts on reducing the spread of this disease.unications Co., Ltd.
ting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the
icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of chicken trade and outbreaks of avian influenza A (H5N1) in poultry and humans.
Year No. of countries
with an H5N1
case in poultry
No. of countries
importing
chickens
from an
infected
country
% of countries
with an
outbreak that
imported
chickens from
an infected
country
No. of chicken
trades between
countries
Thousands
of chickens
imported from
infected
countries
Thousands of
chickens
imported
from
all countries
% of all
imported
chickens that
were from
infected
countries
No. of human
H5N1 cases4
Human case
fatality rate
No. of countries
with an H5N1
case in humans18
2003 2 7 0 702 2180 687,671 0.3 4 100 2
2004 9 7 22 682 35,161 787,585 4.5 46 70 2
2005 9 19 44 672 27,866 854,789 3.3 98 44 5
2006 37 87 68 581 308,001 807,714 38.1 115 69 9
2007 29 80 55 627 374,537 952,675 39.3 88 67 9
2008 22 66 41 598 190,883 967,539 19.7 44 75 6
2009 10 5 20 599 6181 1,116,485 0.6 73 44 5
2010 15 13 13 597 8544 1,203,651 0.7 48 50 5
2011 14 9 14 581 10,321 1,273,598 0.8 62 55 5
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J.M. Radin et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 2 (2017) 412e418414The zoonotic nature and pandemic potential of avian influenza viruses, especially H5N1 (de Jong, Claas, Osterhaus,
Webster, & Lim, 1997), makes their introduction into new countries especially troublesome. As of December 2015, there
have been a total of 844 identified human cases, and 449 deaths, giving a case fatality rate in humans of 53% (World Health
Organization, 2016). Although it is not currently easily transmittable in mammals, and only a couple cases of human-to-
human transmission have occurred, there is concern that this could easily be changed by a few genetic mutations (Russell
et al., 2012). Additionally, H5N1 can have devastating economic impacts from mass culling of sick birds, decreased market
demand during an outbreak, and loss of trade (Chmielewski & Swayne, 2011).
Gaining a better understanding of the drivers that spread avian influenza globally will be important for targeting and
improving future prevention efforts and policies, such as vaccination, increased biosecurity and limiting trade during
epidemic periods. Identifying the mechanism for H5N1 will also be important for understanding the spread of similar avian
influenza viruses of concern, such as H7N9 which recently emerged in China in February 2013 (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2013).
A previous study found that poultry trading and bird migration, played a role in the introductions of avian flu to new
countries, with the magnitude of risk from these two factors differing by region. However, this study was done in 2006 and
didn't assess some of the more recent introductions of avian influenza into new countries and did not assess the specific role
of different species (Kilpatrick et al., 2006).
Other social network analysis models have looked at Live Bird Market (LBM) trade and the spread of H5N1 at the regional
or country level (Fournie et al., 2013; Soares Magalh~aes et al., 2010; Soares Magalh~aes et al., 2012). One study found that
counties in China with H5N1 positive birds identified in LBMs had significantly higher centrality measures than counties
without H5N1 in poultry (Martin et al., 2011), indicating that hub areas may be at greatest risk. Another network study found
that avian influenza disease transmission can be reduced if the network is fragmented through increasing prevention efforts
or limiting trade at the hub sites (Fournie et al., 2013). Additionally, temporal changes in network connectivity, due to
increased demands for poultry consumption, have also been used to identify time periods that may be associatedwith greater
risk (Soares Magalh~aes et al., 2012). Unlike previous studies that have only looked at the local or county level networks, our
study is unique in that it identifies networks of poultry trading at the global level.
The goal of this paper is to determine if the international spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 in poultry have been influ-
enced by themagnitude of poultry traded from infected countries. This study assessed potential covariates on this association
such as year, gross domestic product (GDP), and population size of the importing and exporting country and also examined
the role of different poultry species, including ducks, chickens, and turkeys, in driving H5N1 global spread. Our final model
shows how much risk could be reduced if imports are limited from countries experiencing an H5N1 poultry case or if pre-
vention efforts are increased during these time periods.
Results
In 2003, two countries reported an H5N1 poultry case to theWHO, six years after the last case was identified. This number
of countries with poultry cases increased and peaked to 37 countries in 2006, and declined to 14 by 2011. The number of
countries importing chickens from an infected country followed a similar trend, starting with 7 in 2003, peaking to 87 in
2006, and declining back to 9 in 2011. The percentage of countries with an outbreak in poultry that imported chickens from an
infected country also peaked during 2006. The number of chicken imports from any country appears to have slightly declined
over time from 2003 through 2011; however the quantity of chicken imports has steadily increased. Interestingly, H5N1 cases
in humans followed a similar trend, with the number of cases and number of countries with a case peaking around the same
time as in poultry (Table 1).
We used statistical models to assess the relationship between poultry trade and transmission of H5N1 from one country
to another (see Materials and Methods). This study found significant and positive interaction between quantity of chickensTable 2
GEE model regressing H5N1 infection in the importing country on H5N1 infection in the exporting country, thousands of chickens traded, and their
interaction. Errors clustered on import country. N ¼ 365,418, QIC ¼ 195,618.3, Null QIC ¼ 206,928.9
Effect OR 95% CI p-value
Log (chicken)  H5N1 in export country 1.22 1.08, 1.39 0.0013
Log (chicken) 1.13 0.98, 1.30 0.093
H5N1 in export country 0.93 0.92, 1.06 <0.0001
Year
2003 0.13 0.03, 0.54 0.0051
2004 0.63 0.34, 1.15 0.13
2005 0.63 0.29, 1.34 0.23
2006 3.03 1.82, 5.05 <0.0001
2007 2.25 1.35, 3.74 0.0018
2008 1.65 1.04, 2.59 0.032
2009 0.70 0.45, 1.07 0.101
2010 1.08 0.78, 1.49 0.65
2011 e e e
Table 3
Full GEE modela regressing H5N1 infection in the importing country on H5N1 infection in the exporting country, thousands of chickens
traded, and their interaction. Errors clustered on import country, N ¼ 365,418, QIC ¼ 150,089.7
Effect OR 95% CI p-value
Log (chicken)  H5N1 in export country 1.30 1.12, 1.51 0.0005
Log (chicken) 0.93 0.80, 1.08 0.34
H5N1 in export country 0.92 0.91, 0.93 <0.0001
Year
2003 0.10 0.02, 0.49 0.0041
2004 0.57 0.27, 1.21 0.14
2005 0.57 0.23, 1.40 0.22
2006 4.06 2.20, 7.46 <0.0001
2007 2.77 1.48, 5.21 0.0015
2008 1.84 1.06, 3.19 0.029
2009 0.65 0.39, 1.08 0.10
2010 1.09 0.74, 1.62 0.65
2011 e e e
Log (export population) 1.01 1.00, 1.01 0.0001
Log (import population) 7.17 4.14, 12.43 <0.0001
a Full model is adjusted for log (export population) and log (import population).
J.M. Radin et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 2 (2017) 412e418 415traded and H5N1 poultry infection in the exporting country, in both the non-adjusted (p ¼ 0.0013) and full adjusted models
(p ¼ 0.0005) (Tables 2 and 3). For every unit increase in the log of the number of chickens that were imported from an
infected country, the poultry infection in the importing country increased by a factor of 1.3 (95% CI: 1.1e1.5) for every 10-
fold increase in live chickens imported when adjusting for year, import population and export population. The quantity of
chickens traded (not part of the interaction term) was not significant (p ¼ 0.34), indicating that increased trading of non-
infected chickens did not change risk of infection. We also found that human population in the importing and exporting
country was positively associated with the outcome (Table 3). GDP and GDP per capita were also assessed in the model but
were not statistically significant. Ducks and turkeys were also assessed in a similar model, but ducks did not have a sig-
nificant interaction (Supplementary Table 1) and turkeys had a significantly negative coefficient for the log of the quantity
of turkeys traded (Supplementary Table 2).
The triple interaction models showed significant negative associations for the interaction term of H5N1 in the export
country, log (chickens) and time period (Supplementary Table 3), as well as H5N1 in the export country, log (chickens) and
Southeast Asia or East Asia region (Supplementary Tables 4e5). A third region model with South Asia was also assed but not
found to be significant.
The FAO trade data and WHO reported case data also showed that as the number of imports from infected countries
increased, the probability of infection (as determined from the model in Table 1) also increased, with significantly higher risk
in countries importing from one or more infected countries compared to none in 2006. Therewas a small baseline probability
of infection in countries not importing infectious chickens (Fig. 1).Fig. 1. Probability of infection (SD) in the importing country in 2006 based on the number of infected countries from which they imported chickens.
Fig. 2. Directed acyclic graph showing the relationships between variables included in the model and additional variables that could have played a role in the
relationship between spread of H5N1 between countries.
J.M. Radin et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 2 (2017) 412e418416Using our infection model, we created a Directed Acyclic Graph showing the relationships between all the variables in our
model and additional variables that wewere not able to account for due to lack of data (Fig. 2). It is possible that chicken trade,
bird migration and smuggling all play a role in the spread of H5N1 infection between countries.Discussion
The results of this study suggest that themore chickens a country imports from an infected country, the greater the risk for
having an H5N1 case in poultry. Unfortunately, it may sometimes be difficult for a country to identify infected chickens in a
flock that is being traded. Avian influenza has an incubation period of 3e5 days in chickens (Organization for Animal Health,
2014b), during which time infected birds may unknowingly be traded before they show illness. Additionally, increased use of
avian influenza vaccination in poultry may reduce symptom severity and thus delay detection among a flock (Savill, St Rose,
Keeling, & Woolhouse, 2006). H5N1 also has non-specific symptoms in chickens, which may be misdiagnosed as a similar
looking infection, such as Newcastle disease, unless laboratory tests confirm H5N1 viruses (Organization for Animal Health,
2014b). Infectious disease surveillance and laboratory resources are also limited in some countries and it is likely that many
cases are missed. Consequently, if a country has an identified avian influenza outbreak within its borders, it may be beneficial
to limit all exports for that year or longer, as there are likely to be other undetected cases still circulating. If reducing trade is
not possible, increased prevention efforts such controlling movement of birds and culling of sick animals, combined with
heightened screening and active surveillance of poultry that is being traded will be important for preventing disease
transmission.
Our results also suggest a relatively large risk increase with human population size in the importing country. Since
population size is correlated with GDP, more populous countries may have better resources to identify imported cases.
However, GDP was not found to be significant in the model. A small increase in risk was also associated with an increase in
export population size (Table 3).
Interestingly, we did not find that the trade of turkeys or ducks significantly impacted H5N1 disease spread across borders
(Supplementary Tables 1 and 2). Although, ducks are commonly asymptomatic carriers of avian influenza and shed the virus
for longer (Hulse-Post et al., 2005), the magnitude of duck and turkey trading worldwide was much smaller than that of
chickens. Additionally, the demand for and trade of turkeys was especially low in Asia where H5N1 cases predominate. As
production and demand for ducks and turkeys increase, it will be important to reassess their role in transmission of avian
influenza globally.
Our study did find significant association for the triple interaction termswith the dummy variables time period and region.
This suggests that risk varied by region and time. However, in all models, the main interaction term of H5N1 in the export
country and log (chickens) remained significant (Supplementary Tables 3e5).
Oneweakness of this study is the timeliness and completeness of reported H5N1 poultry cases. Countries sometimes delay
or don't report H5N1 poultry cases due to fear about the negative impact it could have on their economy. Additionally, public
health authorities may not be aware of an outbreak until several weeks later, sincemany outbreaks occur in people's backyard
where they may not recognize the signs and symptoms of avian influenza or may be afraid to report cases to their
J.M. Radin et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 2 (2017) 412e418 417government. Despite this, we found that countries with endemic H5N1 avian flu, such as Egypt and Indonesia, continued to
report cases to the WHO through 2011.
Another weakness of this paper is that it includes ecological level data; therefore we were not able to tie a specific bird
trade to the introduction of avian influenza to a new country. We also only used import data which is sometimes different
than reported export data; however, in most cases they were the same or similar. Additionally, we only knew the year of the
poultry trade: consequently, we did not know for sure whether the trade happened before or after an identified case.
Moreover, it was impossible to know if consecutive yearly H5N1 cases in the same country were the result of continued
infections within the country or reintroductions from outside countries. However, by the end of our study period, only a few
countries were considered to have endemic H5N1 influenza in poultry (FAO-OIE-WHO, 2011).
It is highly likely that other variables not accounted for in our model, also played a significant role in driving H5N1 spread
as seen in our Directed Acyclic Graph (see Fig. 2). One potential risk factor that was not accounted for in our model is
smuggling of birds across borders through illegal trade (van den Berg, 2009). This is not captured by the FAOSTAT database but
could have contributed to the spread of H5N1, especially in some regions where borders are not highly regulated. Addi-
tionally, since we only looked at poultry trade, we do not know the role that migratory birds played in spreading avian
influenza across borders. Avian influenza has been found in many migratory birds and other studies have found that both
poultry trade and migratory birds likely played a key role in transmission of H5N1 around the globe (Kilpatrick et al., 2006).
The elevated baseline probability of H5N1 poultry infection in countries that didn't trade infected chickens, as seen in Fig. 1, is
likely explained by these other factors.
In an effort to feed the current seven billion people on the globe today, it is necessary to reevaluate the risks of shipping our
food thousands of miles around the globe. Gaining a better understanding of how H5N1 spreads internationally is especially
important, as poultry has become one of the fastest-growing livestock industries, due to high consumer demand and low
price compared to other meat sources (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2014). Eating food that is produced locally may
greatly decrease the spread of infectious diseases, such as H5N1 which can threaten economies, livelihoods, and human and
animal health. If a reduction in trade from infectious countries is not possible, improved screening and infection control
practices during epidemic periods can also help reduce transmission across borders.
Methods
Data collection
A historical prospective network designwas used, startingwith the first cases of sustained H5N1 transmission in poultry in
2003 and following the spread forward until 2011. There were two earlier reported cases of H5N1 identified in poultry in 1996
and 1997; however these were not included due to the six year period of no reported poultry outbreaks from 1998 to 2003.
Poultry H5N1 cases were identified from the World Health Organization's avian influenza timeline of events (World Health
Organization, 2012). Binary coding was used for H5N1 infection in each country: countries were considered infected for each
year that they reported an H5N1 case in poultry, regardless of outbreak size, production type (backyard, small farm, in-
dustrial), or species. Reports of H5N1 amongst wild birds were not included. Human avian influenza data was collected from
the World Health Organization's cumulative case report (World Health Organization, 2016).
Poultry importing and exporting data were collected from the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) FAOSTAT
database (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2013). Data was collected from 1996 to 2011 (the most recent year) for live
chickens, ducks, and turkeys. This database includes the value and number of live poultry (1000 heads) that were imported
between each country by year. In some instances, there was a trade reported with a value, but no poultry count because the
magnitude of the tradewas less than 1000 birds, therefore the exact number of the trade could not be determined as the value
per bird varied by country. In these cases, we recoded the trade as 500 poultry heads.
This study included 202 countries, regardless of whether they traded any poultry during the time period of the study.
Country population size, density, and GDP in 2011 were collected from the World Bank's database (The World Bank, 2014).
Statistical analysis
The following Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) model was used to predict H5N1 poultry infection in an importing
country for a given year: Ijt¼ aþ b1Iit*Cijtþ b2*Cijtþ b3Iitþ T2003…2010, where Ijt is H5N1 poultry infection in importing country
j at year t, Iit is H5N1 poultry infection in exporting country i at year t, Cijt is thousands of heads of poultry imported from
country i to country j at year t, and T2003…2010 as year fixed effects. A dummy variablewas used to create year fixed effects. This
variable was included because reporting of H5N1 cases is likely to have fluctuated over the study period as countries became
more aware of this new emerging disease and gained resources for surveillance, identification, and prevention. The GEE
model was selected because our data consisted of repeatedmeasures of imports from each country over time. This model type
allowed us to cluster our errors on import country since trading amongst the same countries was often correlated fromyear to
year (Tables 2 and 3). The same model clustering on export country was also evaluated and yielded substantively identical
results. The role of ducks and turkeys were also assessed separately in an identical model (Supplementary Tables 1e2).
In our adjusted model we assessed the role of human density and population, since previous studies have found an
increased number of poultry H5N1 outbreaks are associated with higher human population density in the same region (Si, de
J.M. Radin et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 2 (2017) 412e418418Boer, & Gong, 2013). We also assessed the model controlling for GDP and GDP per capita since developing countries usually
have less public health resources to investigate outbreaks. Human population, density, GDP, and GDP per capita were log-
transformed since they were not normally distributed. Variables with p < 0.05 were included in our final adjusted model
(Table 3).
Additional models with a triple interaction term for H5N1 in export country*log (quantity of chickens*Time Period) and
onewith H5N1 the export country*log (quantity of chickens)*(region) were assessed to determine if risk varied by region. The
dummy variable for time periodwas coded as 2006e2008 versus all other years and the dummy variable for regionwas coded
as SE Asia versus all other regions and East Asia versus all other regions (Supplementary Tables 3e5).
SAS version 9.3 was used for all statistical analyses: PROC GENMOD was used for the GEE models with a repeated
statement for import country, link ¼ logit and a binary distribution. An independent correlation structure was used. DAGitty
was used to create the Directed Acyclic Graph (Textor, Hardt, & Knüppel, 2011).
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